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In the 197 0's, Michigan and other states were confronted with a medical
malpractice crisis of astronomical proportions. The escalating number of
medical malpractice lawsuits and concomitant increase in malpractice
premiums for health care providers fostered a divisive climate among
doctors, lawyers and patients. In response to this crisis, the Michigan
legislature enacted the Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act. The Act
establishes a process whereby patients may agree to arbitrate any claims
rather than pursue them through the courts.
Part II of this Article discusses the historical evolution of arbitration
as a precursor to its establishment as a resolution modality for health care
disputes. Part III describes the statutory framework of the Michigan
Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act. Part IV discusses the contractual
and constitutional challenges to the arbitration statute and their resolu-
tion in Morris v. Metriyakool.
As the law respecting arbitration becomes less vulnerable to judicial
perforation, this Author suggests that other jurisdictions treat the Michi-
gan Medical Arbitration Program as an archetype, susceptible to replica-
tion.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1975, the Michigan legislature enacted the Medical Malpractice
Arbitration Act.' The purpose of the Act was to ameliorate, if not effec-
tively eliminate, the medical industry's malpractice crisis.2 Members of
* Michigan Regional Director, American Arbitration Asociation; B. A. 1971, M.A. 1975,
Wayne State University; J.D. 1980, Detroit College of Law.
1 1975 Mich. Pub. Acts Nos. 140, 141 (codified at MICH. Comp. LAWS §§ 500.3051-3062,
600.5033-.5065 (1979)).
2 See generally HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., lST
SESS., AN OVERVIEW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 30 (Comm. Print 1975); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
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influential interest groups helped sponsor this legislation, including the
UAW, the Michigan Catholic Conference, the American Federation of
Labor, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Michigan Hospital As-
sociation, the Physicians' Crisis Committee, the Michigan State Medical
Society and the Michigan State Bar.3
Since its adoption and implementation, this arbitration scheme has
divided courts, commentators and members of the medical and legal pro-
fessions regarding its feasibility. 4 Two countervailing philosophical per-
spectives have occupied the forefront of debate. One viewpoint con-
tends that arbitration of medical malpractice claims is not cost effective and
has an imperceptible effect on the reduction of malpractice insurance
premiums. The proponents of this viewpoint maintain further that the
arbitration statute deprives malpractice victims of a full and fair hearing,
thus diluting the due process rights to which all plaintiffs are entitled.5 The
other viewpoint contends that arbitration provides a more expeditious and
economical method for the resolution of malpractice claims. Built-in pro-
cedural safeguards, most notably the fact that arbitration is optional for the
patient, afford adequate due process protection.'
This Article explores the historical framework of arbitration. It will
describe the statutory structure of the process, and assess the various
constitutional and contractual challenges that have been raised. Finally, the
Article discusses an evaluation of Michigan's experience under the Medical
Malpractice Arbitration Act.
II. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE MICHIGAN MEDICAL
ARBITRATION ACT
In the 1970's, the health care profession suffered from a malpractice
crisis of incomparable proportions. 7 Malpractice insurance premiums were
EDUCATION & WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 4 (1973); Lerner, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Response v. Reaction,
AM. ARB. ASS'N WIDE WORLD ARB. 140 (1978); Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: Timefr a
Model Act, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 454 (1981).
' See generally AMERICAN ARB. ASS'N, MICHIGAN MEDICAL ARBITRATION PROGRAM, BULLE-
TIN No. 1 (1980).
'See, e.g., Ducastel, Medical Malpractice: Fact or Fiction?, 60 MICH. BAR J. 940 (1981);
Mengel, The Constitutional and Contractual Challenges to Michigan's Medical Malpractice Aribitration
Act, 59 J. URB. LAWS 319 (1982); Sidel, Malpractice Rejorm in Michigan, 1976 DET. C.L. Rev.
235; Note, The Michigan Malpractice Acts Requirement of a Physician on the Panel Violates the Due
Process Rights to a Fair and Impartial Tribunal, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1843 (1982).
' See Schoonmaker, The Medical Malpractice Arbitration Program in Michigan, INS. L.J. 370
(1977); Note, supra note 4; see also, injia notes 33-56 and accompanying text.
6 See Morris v. Metriyakool 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984); see also infra notes 34-56
and accompanying text.
Increasing numbers of malpractice verdicts against doctors, hospitals and other
health service providers resulted in rapidly escalating malpractice insurance costs and
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escalating at an astounding rate, while concomitantly, the availability of
malpractice insurance was shrinking.' In Michigan, this situation was
exacerbated by the fact that malpractice insurance was not being offered to
new or incoming doctors by the companies who had been providing nearly
ninety-three percent of the malpractice insurance policies. 9 In an effort to
develop a more supportive atmosphere for health care practitioners, nu-
merous states began to contemplate alternatives to stave off or curtail the
expansion of the malpractice crisis. Most states responded by enacting
some type of medical malpractice reform legislation;1" many of these re-
sponses included some form of arbitration mechanism.'"
Arbitration has long been accepted as an effective and non-combative
form of dispute resolution. It was well-institutionalized even before the
development of English common law. Scholars have traced its origin to the
Athenian culture in 700 B.C.12 The United States Supreme Court exam-
ined the viability of arbitration as a form of dispute resolution in the
Steelworkers Trilogy of 1960.13 The Court addressed the importance of pre-
a general deterioration of the medical profession's liability insurance marketplace.
Several insurers reduced the scope of available malpractice liability coverage, and in
some regions physicians experienced difficulty in obtaining insurance at any price.
Note, supra note 2, at 454.
1 The crisis elicited a national inquiry. In 1971, the Department of Health, Education &
Welfare established a Medical Malpractice Commission. The Commission sponsored a 1.5
million dollar research project and conducted public hearings. The Commission concluded:
The total number of claims paid does not appear to be as important a factor in the
overall problem as does the number that give rise to large settlements or awards.
These relatively few claims (the 6.1 percent above $40,000) appear to be the ones that
most alarm health-care providers. [M]ore than half of the claimants who receive
payment get less than $3,000, the other half receive more. Less than one out of every
1,000 claims paid is for $1 million or more, and there are probably not more than
seven such payments each year. There is little doubt that the number of large awards
or settlements has been increasing dramatically within the recent past.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, supra note 2, at 10.
9 Mengel, supra note 4, at 319 (citing H.R. CONG. REs. 14, 78th Leg., 3d Sess., 1975 J.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STATE OF MICH. 107; H.R. REs. 15, 78th Leg., 4th Sess., 1975J. OF
THE STATE OF MICH. 127-28).
11 Ladimer, Medical Malpractice Claims, in ARBITRATION: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSUR-
ANCE, AND TORT CLAIMS 301-02 (A. Widiss ed. 1979).
1 See ALA. CODE § 6-5-485 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (1983); CAL. CIv. PROC.
Code § 1295 (West 1982); GA. CODE §§ 9-9-110 to -133 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10,
§§ 201-214 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984): LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4230-:4236 (1983); MICH.
CoMp. LAws §§ 600.5040-5065 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29-01 to -10 (1976); OHto REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 27.11.21-.24 (Page 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-25B-1 to -3 (1979);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.12 (1984).
12 C. WOOLEY, THE SUMERIANS 93-94 (1929).
13 The trilogy consisted of three steel workers union disputes: United Steelworkers of
America v. American Mfg. Corp., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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serving an extra-judicial mechanism which fundamentally served the inter-
ests of the private industrial sector.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 1 4 the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the importance of the arbitration process. In this landmark
decision, the Court held that an employee's statutory right to trial de novo
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not foreclosed by a prior
submission of his claim to final and binding arbitration pursuant to a
nondiscrimination clause in a collective bargaining agreement.
15
While many arbitration opponents have construed Gardner-Denver as a
decision which restricts an arbitrator's authority, the effect on the arbitra-
tion process was minimal. The Court's emphasis was not on whether arbi-
tration would occupy a pivotal position in the dispute resolution arena, but
rather on the process by which individual employee rights should be
guarded. The Court merely separated statutory rights from collective bar-
gaining or contractual rights. Thus, Gardner-Denver did not condemn the
arbitral process. Rather, it suggested that arbitration may not be appropri-.
ate for the resolution of a discrimination claim if the arbitrator's compe-
tence is limited to an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Court addressed several critical issues. The principal issue was whether arbitration
could be compelled by a party to a contract. The Court held that while the determination of
arbitrability lies exclusively within the province of the courts, the courts should not intercede
unless the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the dispute. The
courts use this as a pretext to invoke jurisdiction. All doubts relating to arbitrability must be
resolved in favor of the arbitration process. Warrior and Gui] Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at
582-83.
The second issue concerned the scope of judicial review. The Court held that the
interpretation of the agreements was clearly for the arbitrator to decide. Courts were not
empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the arbitrator. The Court's opinion
contained this significant and much-quoted paragraph:
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective bargaining
agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair
solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to formulating remedies.
There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situations. The
draftsmen may never have thought of what specific remedy should be awarded to
meet a particular contingency. Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpreta-
tion and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to
dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance
from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an
infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the awards.
Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597 (emphasis added).
Third, the Court discussed the merits of a dispute brought for judicial hearing. The
Court observed that it is not for the courts to make excursions into an arbitrator's jurisdiction,
and render determinations on the merits of a dispute. No matter the extent that it appears the
arbitrator's opinion is improper or incorrect, it cannot be modified unless the arbitrator
abused or exceeded his contractual authority. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. at
598-99; see also Note, Arbitration and the Courts, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 466 (1963).
14 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
15 Id. at 49.
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The resolution of a discrimination claim must address statutory viola-
tions. 16
The Michigan Supreme Court provided support for arbitration in
Michigan in Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School District No. 6 v. Kaleva-Norman-
Dickson School Teachers' Association. I Here, the court held that without an
express provision that excluded a particular grievance from arbitration, the
contested matter had to proceed to arbitration. 8 The Court placed the
burden on the party requesting judicial relief to establish that the matter in
dispute was explicitly not recognizable under the general arbitration
clause.1 9
Thus, when faced with the health care crisis in the early 1970's,
Michigan considered adopting a unique, comprehensive and more respon-
sive dispute resolution mechanism to counter the professional concerns
which the crisis had generated. In 1975, the Michigan legislature enacted
the Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act,20 establishing voluntary arbitra-
tion as an alternative forum for seeking redress in malpractice cases. One
of the chief arguments against the adoption of arbitration was that it would
reduce the number and size of the awards to patients.
Prior to the passage of this legislation, the Insurance Commission
presented a comprehensive report to the Governor.2 1 This report tenta-
tively responded to opponents' concerns that malpractice arbitration would
reduce judgment amounts. While the Commissioner's Report suggested
that an accurate assessment of whether an arbitration system would reduce
the number of sizeable judgments was impossible, the Report recom-
mended that legislation be adopted to permit the establishment of contrac-
tual and binding arbitration in medical malpractice cases.2 2
16 The Court had previously addressed this issue in United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960), stating:
Arbitral procedures, while well-suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make
arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights
created by Title VII. This conclusion rests first on the special role of the arbitrator,
whose task is to effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the requirements of
enacted legislation. Where the collective-bargaining agreement conflicts with Title
VII, the arbitration must follow the agreement. To be sure, the tension between
contractual and statutory objectives may be mitigated where a collective-bargaining
agreement contains provisions facially similar to those of Title VII. But other facts
may still render arbitral processes comparatively inferior to judicial processes in the
protection of Title VII rights. Among these is the fact that the specialized compe-
tence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land.
17 393 Mich. 583, 227 N.W.2d 500 (1975).
I8 1d. at 591, 227 N.W.2d at 503-04.
19 Id. at 595, 227 N.W.2d at 506.
20 1975 Mich. Pub. Acts Nos. 140, 141 (codified at MICH. CoMp. LAWS §§ 500.3051-3062,
600.5033-5065 (1979)).
21 DEMLOW & DIVELY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN MICHIGAN 6 (Mich., Feb. 18, 1975).
22 1d. at 21.
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The Insurance Commission furnished an additional report to the
Governor immediately prior to the passage of the Act which set forth the
goals of the legislation. The legislation sought to reduce the costs of settling
medical malpractice disputes; to promote equitable settlements and avoid
unnecessary appeals; to expedite the resolution of malpractice claims; and
to offer a patient freedom of choice by instituting arbitration as a voluntary
alternative to litigation.2 3 The failure to establish a definitive statistical
correlation between arbitration and reduced malpractice verdicts lessened
the impact of such concerns in the ultimate design and establishment of the
arbitration scheme.
III. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE MICHIGAN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION ACT
In 1976, the Michigan Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act (the Act)
2 4
established a system which offered arbitration to patients as a way of
resolving disputes arising from health care furnished by a physician, hospi-
tal, or other health care provider.25 The Act mandated that insured hospi-
tals, HMO's, clinics, and sanatoria offer an Agreement to Arbitrate to
patients. Further, the statute provided for the administration of arbitration
proceedings "by the American Arbitration Association or other entity or-
ganized to arbitrate disputes pursuant to this chapter. 1 6 The statute also
provides an optional arbitration mechanism for patients treated or exam-
ined in the office of a health care provider.
2 7
The Act does not compel arbitration of all medical claims; arbitration
is elective. Patients who believe they have a claim for medical negligence
may seek arbitration or sue in court. The patient's election to arbitrate must
be demonstrated by an Agreement to Arbitrate. If the agreement is not
revoked by the patient or his legal representative,2 8 then the claim is
appropriate for arbitration. The statute states that the agreement will
expire one year after its execution but may be renewed.
2 9
An impartial panel makes the determination of medical negligence
and concomitant liability. The three-member panel consists of an attorney,
who serves as the chairperson; a physician, hospital administrator or other
health care licensee; and a member of the public. Panel members must be
23Jones, Medical Malpractice Insurance-An Update 81 (June 6, 1977).
24 1975 MICH. PuB. ACTS Nos. 140, 141 (codified at MIcHi. COMP. LAWS §§ 500.3051-
.3062, 600.5033-.5065 (1979)).
25 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5041(1) (1979).
26 MICH. COMe. LAWS § 600.5040(2)(a) (1979).
27 MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 600.5042(5) (1979).
28 A patient may revoke an Agreement to Arbitrate within sixty days of being discharged
from the hospital. Micti. CoMp. LAWS §§ 600.5041(3), 600.5042(3) (1979).
29 MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 600.5041(4) (1979).
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mutually agreed upon by the parties.3 0 A 1980 amendment to the Act
established new procedures which included the substitution of a dentist for
a physician in cases concerning alleged dental malpractice.3 1
The composition of the panel, specifically the inclusion of a medical
specialist, and the manner in which arbitration is offered, i.e. within the
hospital admission context, led to a myriad of constitutional and contrac-
tual challenges to the statute.
IV. THE LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ARBITRATION ACT
Within months of its formal implementation, the Medical Malpractice
Arbitration Act was beset with numerous constitutional and contractual
challenges. The appeals court decisions addressing these challenges fre-
quently differed as to the validity of the arbitration process for medical
malpractice claims, 3 2 The Michigan Supreme Court resolved these chal-
lenges in favor of the validity of the Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act on
both constitutional and contractual issues in Morris v. Metriyakool. 3 3 Before
Morris, the constitutional and contractual challenges elicited conflicting
judicial perspectives.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Plaintiffs challenging the validity of arbitration agreements have raised
primarily two constitutional issues.: First, they have claimed that the com-
position of the arbitration panel, specifically the inclusion of a medical
specialist on the panel, violates their right to an impartial tribunal and
thereby deprives them of due process. 34 Additionally, they have argued
30 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5044(3) (1979).
"' MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5044(2) (1979).
32 The court of appeals in Michigan is an intermediate appellate court. It has statewide
jurisdiction of those cases "appealed as of right." Eighteen judges comprise the court. Each
judge is assigned to three-judge panels on a rotation basis. Judges for each panel are assigned
by the ChiefJudge of the Court of Appeals. Unanimous decisions are not required; a majority
decision establishes a statewide precedent.
13 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984).34 See, e.g., Edwards v. St. Mary's Hosp., 120 Mich. App. 1, 327 N.W.2d 377 (1982);
Ballard v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 119 Mich. App. 814, 327 N.W.2d 370 (1982); Christman
v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 118 Mich. App. 719, 325 N.W.2d 801 (1982); Gale v.
Providence Hosp., 118 Mich. App. 405, 325 N.W.2d 439 (1982); Cushman v. Frankel, 111
Mich. App. 604, 314 N.W.2d 705 (1981); Brown v. Considine, 108 Mich. App. 504, 310
N.W.2d 441 (1981); Brown v. Siang, 107 Mich. App. 91, 309 N.W.2d 575 (1981); see also
Mengel, supra note 4. The Author contends that another issue can be discerned in these cases,
making a fair case for what is known as "substantive due process." The Act violates due
process because it abolishes a victim's common law right to sue in a civil court for a health care
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that the arbitration agreement impermissibly leads them to waive their
right to a jury trial and that such a waiver should not be valid. 35 While the
panels of the court of appeals have offered conflicting opinions on these
issues, the Michigan Supreme Court, in Morris, resolved these issues in
favor of the Act's constitutionality and the validity of the agreements.
1. Deprivation of Procedural Due Process
Plaintiffs in malpractice disputes have argued that the presence of a
medical specialist on the panel constitutes a bias toward the health care
provider, thereby depriving the plaintiff of a fair and full hearing. 3 They
have contended that the fact that one member of a panel must be a doctor
or hospital administrator "creates a situation in which 'the probability of
actual bias on the part of the ... decisionmaker is too high to be constitu-
tionally tolerable.' "3 The panels of the court of appeals have responded
differently to these arguments. In Morris v. Metriyakool,3 s the appellate
panel concluded that the Michigan Medical Arbitration Act was not uncon-
stitutional since it did not deprive patients of a meaningful opportunity to
decide whether to relinquish their constitutional right to "court access." 39
The court said that the arbitration form adequately informs the patient
that arbitration is a substitute for a trial by judge or jury. The court relied
on the presumption that an election to arbitrate is voluntary and not the
result of coercion. 40
provider's negligent acts. However, to justify the existence of substantive due process, a party
must demonstrate "either that there is no public purpose to be served by the statute, or that
there is no reasonable relationship between the remedy adopted by the legislature and the
public purpose." Mengel, supra note 4, at 325. The first portion of the legal equation can be
overcome; the first part of this Article suggests that the malpractice crisis needed to be
addressed by providing alternatives to litigation. Thus, the public purpose prong of the test is
satisfied. Insofar as the second aspect is concerned, the remedy of the state legislature was to
provide a method of dispute resolution which would expedite claims disposition, and confront
the malpractice crisis. Arbitration was never intended to displace litigation but was designed as
an alternative method for the plaintiff to pursue his remedy for tortuous negligent conduct.
Still, it is questionable whether the second aspect of the test can be met.
3 See, e.g., Moore v. Fragatos, 116 Mich. App. 179, 321 N.W.2d 781 (1982).
" See, e.g., Sabatini v. Marcuz, 122 Mich. App. 494, 332 N.W.2d 629 (1982); McKinstry v.
Valley Obstetrics/Gynecology, 120 Mich. App. 479, 327 N.W.2d 507 (1982); Lovell v. Sisters of
Mercy Health Corp., 119 Mich. App. 44, 325 N.W.2d 619 (1982); Horn v. Cooke, 118 Mich.
App. 740, 325 N.W.2d 558 (1982); Murray v. Wilner, 118 Mich. App. 352, 325 N.W.2d 422
(1982); Malek v. Jayakar, 116 Mich. App. 111, 321 N.W.2d 858 (1982); Rome v. Sinai Hosp.,
112 Mich. App. 387, 316 N.W.2d 428 (1982); Piskorski v. Art Centre Hosp., 110 Mich. App.
22, 312 N.W.2d 160 (1981); Williams v. O'Connor, 108 Mich. App. 613, 310 N.W.2d 825
(1981); Pipper v. Di Musto, 88 Mich. App. 743, 279 N.W.2d 534 (1979).
3 7 Jackson v. Detroit Mem. Hosp., 110 Mich. App. 202,204,312 N.W.2d 212, 213 (1981),
rev'd sub nom., Morris v. Metriyakool, 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984).
'1 107 Mich. App. 110, 309 N.W.2d 910 (1981), aff'd, 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736
(1984).
39 107 Mich. App. at 115, 309 N.W.2d at 911.
4
0 Id.
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The appellate panel stated that the medical member of the arbitration
board did not have a sufficient interest in the outcome of the malpractice
award to disturb his impartiality.41 Without an indication of actual bias, and
because the statutory procedure for the selection of the panel did not
suggest a probability of systematic bias or prejudice, the requirements of
due process were satisfied. 42
The dissent in Morris arrived at different conclusions. 43 After review-
ing other decisions in which courts found an intolerable risk of bias, the
dissent argued that
as the state-fostered arbitration system is currently structured it is
inherently unlikely that any individual who agrees to arbitrate will
understand the due process implications of this decision. The
portion of the statute relating to the composition of the arbitration
panels violates due process of law by forcing the litigant to submit
his or her claim to a tribunal which is composed in such a way that
a high probability exists that said tribunal will be biased against the
claimant without mandating the use of an arbitration form
explicitly detailing the nature of the panel's makeup.
44
The dissent also considered the contention that the contract is unconscion-
able. The dissent acknowledged that "a declaration of unconscionability
manifestly involves policy determinations1 45 and accordingly deferred to
the policy set forth by the legislature as "policy-making is a legislative
perogative." 46
Other panels of the appeals court did not reach the same conclusions
as the Morris majority. In Jackson v. Detroit Memorial Hospital,47 the court
adopted the position of the dissent in Morris and held the statute was
unconstitutional for creating a risk of bias that was unacceptable. In
Jackson, the plaintiff executed a standard Agreement to Arbitrate, and did
not revoke the agreement during the sixty day period following her dis-
charge. She subsequently instituted an action claiming that she was injured
as a result of defendant's riegligent treatment.
The plaintiff's primary argument was that the Michigan Medical Arbi-
tration Act violated her due process right to a hearing before a fair and
impartial tribunal by mandating that at least one member of the arbitration
board be a physician or hospital administrator.4" The court, relying upon
41 Id. at 120, 309 N.W.2d at 913.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 121, 309 N.W.2d at 913 (Bronson, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part).
44 Id. at 134, 309 N.W.2d at 919-20.
4 1d. at 137-38, 309 N.W.2d at 921.
46 Id.
47 Jackson v. Detroit Mem. Hosp., 110 Mich. App. 202, 204, 312 N.W.2d 212, 213 (1981),
rev'd sub nom., Morris v. Metriyakool, 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984).
48 Id. at 204, 312 N.W.2d at 213.
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the dissent in Morris,4 9 concluded that the statutorily prescribed composi-
tion of the arbitration panel created a situation in which the probability of
decision-maker bias on the part of the panel was too high to be constitu-
tionally tolerable. 50
Further, in Piskorski v. Art Centre Hospital,5 the court considered the
conflicting opinions among the appellate judges and concluded that the
reasoning in Jackson was the most compelling. The court also held that the
Act was unconstitutional.
Subsequent decisions increasingly followed Jackson and the dissent in
Morris and held that the statute was unconstitutional. Several judges
changed their earlier opinions and concluded that the panel created a
constitutionally impermissible risk of bias. In Strong v. Oakwood Hospital,52
Judge Riley reversed her earlier position and held that "the composition of
the panel and the failure to advise the patient of this fact are violative of his
due process rights. 53
In Morris, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the trend among the
panels of the court of appeals, holding that the statute was not unconstitu-
tional. 54 The court looked for "a pecuniary interest which creates a proba-
bility of unfairness, a risk of actual bias which is too high to be constitution-
ally tolerable" 55 and held that such a risk was not demonstrated. The court
acknowledged the relationship between the malpractice insurance awards
and the cost of malpractice insurance, and recognized that health care
providers will be affected by a decision by the malpractice panel. The court,
however, held that this was insufficient to offend due process, saying "[w]e
have been shown no grounds for us to conclude that these decisionmakers
will not act with honesty and integrity. 56
The supreme court properly rejected the trend among appeals courts
and affirmed the Morris majority's opinion. The fact that one member of a
panel must be a doctor or a hospital administrator does not necessarily
deprive a patient of the right to a fair and impartial hearing. All doctors
and hospital administrators are not biased in favor of other doctors or
hospitals. The peculiar education and knowledge of persons in the medical
field are irreplaceable on a medical malpractice arbitration board. Further,
a doctor or hospital administrator occupies a minority position on the
board. While a particular doctor or hospital administrator may make a
prejudicial decision because of potential malpractice insurance premium
49 1d. at 204, 312 N.W.2d at 214.
50 Id.
" 110 Mich. App. 22, 312 N.W.2d 160 (1981).
51 118 Mich. App. 395, 325 N.W.2d 435 (1982).
531 d. at 399, 325 N.W.2d at 437.
5' 418 Mich. at 423, 344 N.W.2d at 739.
-5 Id. at 423, 344 N.W.2d at 738.56Id.
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increases, this does not warrant the conclusion that all doctors and hospital
administrators should thereby be disqualified from the board. The value of
their service outweighs the potential cost, absent-a showing of actual bias.
The doctor or hospital administrator panel member does not have a direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the arbitration, a requisite for finding
that a party to an arbitration proceeding has been denied due process.
Members of an arbitration panel who are doctors or hospital administrators
do not, on the basis of their professional designations alone, create a biased
panel. A patient is not denied due process by having his claim settled by an
arbitration panel that includes a doctor or hospital administrator particu-
larly when the arbitration agreements, as here, are entered into voluntarily.
2. Right to Trial by Jury
The panels of the court of appeals have rendered conflicting decisions
on the issue of whether plaintiffs have been deprived of due process
because they have waived their right to "judicial process" without being
adequately informed as to the significance of the waiver of that right.5 7
Initially, appellate decisions addressing this issue uniformly dismissed this
argument by holding that the language of the agreement clearly informed
the patient that arbitration was a substitute for a trial by a jury.5 8 These
decisions emphasized that an arbitration agreement in Michigan is pre-
sumed to be valid if certain procedural requirements are met. The statute
requires that health care providers seeking to use an arbitration agreement
distribute an informational brochure.5 9 The brochure states, in boldface
type, that health care will be furnished irrespective of whether the agree-
ment is executed. Additionally, the patient has the right to revoke the
agreement within sixty days of execution by written notification to the
hospital.6 0 Agreements which comply with these provisions are presump-
tively valid. The party challenging the validity of the agreement has the
burden of demonstrating that the agreement is, in fact, invalid. The pre-
sumption of validity if the procedural requirements are met prevents the
frustration of the entire legislative scheme.
Subsequent decisions by panels of the appeals court, however, con-
cluded that access to the court system is a fundamental constitutional right
57 Compare Moore v. Fragatos, 116 Mich. App. 179, 321 N.W.2d 781 (1982), with Morris v.
Metriyakool, 107 Mich. App. 110, 309 N.W.2d 910 (1981), aff'd, 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d
736 (1984).
58 See Williams v. O'Connor, 108 Mich. App. 613, 310 N.W.2d 825 (1981); Brown v.
Siang, 107 Mich. App. 91, 309 N.W.2d 575 (1981); Morris, 107 Mich. App. 110, 309 N.W.2d
910 (1981). Albeit Judge Burns dissented in this case, his dissent was predicated upon the
failure to designate the nature of the panel's composition in the arbitration agreement. This
omission, he contended, was the quintessence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right
to a jury trial.
59 MICH. CoMp. LAws § 600.5041(6) (1979).60 Id.
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and cannot be cavalierly waived. In Moore v. Fragatos,6 ' the appeals court
stated that the arbitration agreement amounts to a waiver of a patient's
constitutional right to a jury trial and such a waiver must be made know-
ingly, intelligently and voluntarily.6 2 The plaintiff had been admitted to a
hospital for treatment by the defendant. Upon admission, he signed an
agreement to arbitrate. The plaintiff claimed that he never read the pa-
pers; did not remember being informed of their nature; and thought that
they were admittance papers and needed to be signed. The defendant
contended that the agreement to arbitrate was valid and should be en-
forced.
The court held that the agreement to arbitrate caused the plaintiff to
relinquish his constitutional right to a trial by jury and his right to access to
the courts. Accordingly, the court set forth guidelines to examine whether
this waiver was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. For a waiver
to be knowing, the court said that the "record must affirmatively show that
the plaintiff was aware that he was signing an arbitration agreement. '63
The court held that the presumption against a waiver of a constitutional
right was greater than the presumption that "a person has read what he has
signed. '64 Accordingly, the court required additional evidence to demon-
strate that the waiver was knowing.
The court also held that the waiver must be intelligent. The court said
[i]n order to make an intelligent choice, a person must be in-
formed of theconsequences of his decision: i.e., the material dif-
ferences between malpractice arbitration and trial in civil court.
Imaterial' information, in our view, is information that a reason-
able person would consider important in deciding whether or not
to sign an arbitration agreement. 65
The court held that a party
seeking to assert the waiver of a patient's right to access to the
courts must affirmatively show that the patient was informed (1)
that by signing the form, he would be giving up his right to trial by
jury or ajudge, (2) that the arbitration panel that would decide his
case would include an attorney, a layman, and a doctor or hospital
administrator, and (3) that doctors and hospital administrators on
arbitration panels may have an incentive to minimize the number
and size of malpractice awards, because their malpractice insur-
ance rates are directly affected by those awards. 66
6' 116 Mich. App. 179, 321 N.W.2d 781 (1982).
62 1d. at 186, 321 N.W.2d at 785.
63 Id. at 188, 321 N.W.2d at 786.
64Id. at 187, 321 N.W.2d at 786.
65 1d. at 189, 321 N.W.2d at 786.
" Id. at 194, 321 N.W.2d at 789.
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Finally, the court required that a patient must waive his constitutional
right voluntarily. The court reviewed the "coerciveness inherent in the
physician-patient relationship," and said
that a party seeking to assert the waiver of a patient's right to
access to the courts must affirmatively show that the patient was
informed (1) that he did not have to sign the arbitration agree-
ment, (2) that the patient would receive the same quality of medi-
cal treatment and would be attended to just as quickly whether or
not he chose to sign the agreement, (3) that doctors and hospitals
are not permitted to refuse treatment to patients who do not sign
the agreement, and (4) that signing the agreement is entirely up to
the patient. 67
The court did not find that the statute was unconstitutional or that the
agreement was unconscionable. It held that a party seeking to uphold an
arbitration agreement must present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that
the patient knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily chose to relinquish his
constitutional right to access to the courts.
The court recognized that while the jury trial is fundamental to the
system of American jurisprudence, a person is entitled to select the forum
and tribunal in which a malpractice dispute should be resolved. In essence,
an individual possesses this right and can voluntarily relinquish it only after
he has been given all the salient information. Although some commen-
tators have treated this perfunctory assessment of the court of appeals as
incongruous with the high esteem in which the right has always been held
by Western jurisprudence,6 8 their analysis avoids the real issue: whether an
unrestrained election to pursue arbitration of malpractice claims deprives
the patient of meaningful access to a hearing. To assume that the average
patient does not understand the implications of his or her execution of an
arbitration agreement suggests that the law should immunize these people
from the improvidence of their actions.
The legislative goal in designing the Act was to provide an alternative
forum for the resolution of malpractice disputes. The arbitration mecha-
nism is not an inferior adjudicatory process but a process which functions
with equivalent procedural and substantive safeguards to ensure that due
process is maintained.
B. THE CONTRACTUAL ISSUES
1. Unconscionability and Adhesion Contracts
As a method of dispute resolution, arbitration is based on freedom to
67 1d. at 197, 321 N.W.2d at 790.
68 See Mengel, supra note 4.
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contract principles.6 Courts will generally uphold arbitration agreements
because of their voluntary nature.7 0 A court will not enforce an arbitration
agreement if it finds that it is an unconscionable contract.
71
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs unconsciona-
bility.72 This section contains a number of criteria which signal unconscion-
sability, including fraud, illegality, warranty liability and the tort of misrep-
resentation. A panel of the Michigan appeals court said "[u]nconscionabil-
ity has generally been recognized to include an absence of a meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party.1
7 3
Unconscionability is often confused with, but is distinct from, the con-
cept of an adhesion contract. The typical adhesion contract consists of a
standard form drafted by a party who possesses strong bargaining power
and offered to a party who possesses less or no bargaining power. The
weaker party has no choice but to accept the terms of the contract, as
changes cannot be negiotiated. The weaker party is virtually coerced into
execution because the stronger party is the only party who can provide the
goods or service, thus coercion is masked by "voluntary" consent.74 While
unequal bargaining power is the primary factor in determining an adhe-
sion contract, it is only part of the consideration in determining if a contract
is unconscionable.
Plaintiffs opposing arbitration agreements have argued that the
agreements were both adhesion contracts and unconscionable contracts.
69 See S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1023 (3d ed. 1961 & Supp.
1980).
7o See, e.g., Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Gavin, 416 Mich. 407, 331
N.W.2d 143 (1982); Bricklayers and Stone Masons Union, Local No. 2 v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 775
(D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally S. WILLISTON, supra note 69, at § 1721.
"' See, e.g., Lovell v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 119 Mich. App. 44, 325 N.W.2d 619
(1982); Ballard v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 119 Mich. App. 814, 327 N.W.2d 370 (1982). See
generally S. WILLISTON, supra note 69, at § 1763A.
72 See Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 119 Mich. App. at 44, 325 N.W.2d at 619 (1982). All
states but three have now adopted UCC § 2-302 which reads as follows:
1. If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscion-
able clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result.
2. When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.
7 Strong, 118 Mich. App. at 400-01, 325 N.W.2d at 438 (quoting Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
74 Id.
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The panels of the court of appeals have consistently held that the arbitra-
tion agreements were not adhesion contracts7 5 because they were not
preconditions to receiving health care and because patients could revoke
them within sixty days of being discharged from the hospital.
7 6
In contrast with the consistency of the courts on the adhesion contract
issue, panels of the court of appeals have differed on whether the arbitra-
tion agreement constituted an unconscionable contract. In Strong v. Oak-
wood, 77 the court found that the arbitration agreement was "unreasonable
due to the lack of information presented to the patient such that a person
of common sense who was aware of the deficiencies would not sign the
agreement"7 8 and consequently unconscionable. The court listed some of
the deficiencies it found with the contract:
The form which is signed fails to advise the patient of the compos-
ition of the panel. The agreement does not explain the truncated
appellate process available after the arbitration .... The form
does not advise the patient or his family what procedures should
be taken to revoke the agreement should the patient die while in
the hospital or shortly after discharge from it. Furthermore, the
agreement does not adequately explain the range of actions cov-
ered by the agreement.7 9
In Morris, the supreme court rejected these arguments and held that the
arbitration agreement was not unconscionable. Since arbitration was the
primary purpose of the agreement, the court said that "we do not believe
that an ordinary person signing this agreement to arbitrate would rea-
sonably expect a jury trial."' 0
2. Right to Revocation
The Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act provides that the patient or
his legal representative may revoke an Agreement to Arbitrate within sixty
days of signing."' However, the Agreement is binding upon the health care
provider, granting no revocation or termination option. 82
Plaintiffs seeking to avoid an arbitration agreement and defendants
who would like to have the courts enforce an agreement have litigated
issues surrounding the validity and timeliness of a revocation of the agree-
"
5 See, e.g., Morris, 107 Mich. App. at 110, 309 N.W.2d at 910.
76 See id.; see also Gale, 118 Mich. App. 405, 325 N.W.2d 439 (1982).
118 Mich. App. 395, 325 N.W.2d 435 (1982).
7' Id. at 402, 325 N.W.2d at 437.
19 Jd. at 402-03, 325 N.W.2d at 438.
" 418 Mich. at 423, 344 N.W.2d at 739.
"' MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5041(3) (1979).
82 Id.
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ment. For example, in Amwake v. Mercy Hospital,83 the plaintiff was com-
atose following an operation and was then transferred from the defendant
hospital to another hospital. The court rejected the defendant's conten-
tions that the agreement was not validly revoked and held that the revoca-
tion was valid under any of three theories. First, the court said that the
filing of a complaint would serve to impliedly revoke an arbitration agree-
ment. Second, the court said that the transfer from one hospital to another
did not constitute a discharge, otherwise, "hospitals could shuttle patients
from one hospital to another to start the 60-day period."84 Finally, the
court analogized the patient's comatose condition to other disabilities and
held that the sixty day period should begin at the time the disability is
removed, in other words, at the time the patient or legal representative
could revoke the agreement.8 5
A patient's ability to revoke an arbitration agreement was enhanced in
Boiko v. Henry Ford Hospital. 8 6 In Boiko, the plaintiff had died in the hospital,
and was therefore never "discharged." The court rejected the plaintiff's
arguments that the sixty day period should never commence as the patient
was never discharged. The court sought to interpret the statute as a whole,
and relied on the provision that the agreements should apply to all in-
stances of medical malpractice, including those that cause death. The court
resisted the temptation to equate death with the term "discharge" and held
that the sixty day period began when a legal representative was appointed.
By so holding, the legal representative would have the benefit of the full
sixty days in accordance with the legislative policy expressed in the stat-
ute.87
Further, in DiPonio v. Henry Ford Hospital,8 8 the court held that the
sixty day revocation period should not begin for a patient who dies in the
hospital until a personal representative is appointed or the personal rep-
resentative discovers or should discover the arbitration agreement. Relying
on Amwake, the court arrived at the same conclusion as the Boiko court. In
addition, the DiPonio court would allow additional time for a personal
representative who did not know and would not have known about the
arbitration agreement. The court adopted the reasoning of the "discovery
rule" in tort law where the statute of limitations does not commence until
the victim discovers or should discover the injury.8 9
The courts have been willing to extend the sixty day revocation period
by analogizing to circumstances involving other statutes of limitations.
11 92 Mich. App. 546, 285 N.W.2d 369 (1979).
84id. at 552, 285 N.W.2d at 372.
I ld. at 553-54, 285 N.W.2d at 372-73.
86 110 Mich. App. 514, 313 N.W.2d 344 (1981).
811d. at 520, 313 N.W.2d at 346-47.
" 109 Mich. App. 243, 311 N.W.2d 754 (1981).
s
91d. at 250, 252-53, 311 N.W.2d at 737-38.
HeinOnline -- 10 Am. J.L. & Med. 302 1984-1985
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION ACT
These extensions protect patients' constitutional rights and effectuate the
legislature's policy as expressed in the statute.
V. EVALUATION AND EXPERIENCE UNDER THE MICHIGAN
MEDICAL ARBITRATION PROGRAM
As with any new modality, the Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act
sparked significant interest in assessing the impact of arbitration on the
management of medical malpractice disputes in Michigan. The statute
required that an assessment of the malpractice arbitration mode occur
within three years of its implementation. 90 In 1982, Applied Social Re-
search, Inc., (ASR) an Oregon based firm, assumed contractual respon-
sibilities for the evaluation. Preliminary reports began to be released in
August of 1983.
ASR issued its final report in October, 1983, including six detailed
surveys of claims incidents, arbitration, patients' perspective, the hospital
personnel and insurance company chief executive's perspectives. 9' The
evaluation examined various dimensions, including time limits, costs, pre-
dictability, access and fairness/justice. The report made recommendations
to aid in curing the "perceived" defects of the arbitration process.
A. VALIDITY OF SIGNED ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The report stated that given the concern that patients may or may not
be sufficiently informed when they execute an arbitration agreement, a
more formal presentation or indoctrination concerning the aspects of arbi-
tration should be made at the time the patient is presented with the
agreement.9 2 To accomplish this, the report proposed several modifica-
tions. The report suggested that a physician should assume responsibility
for the accurate presentation of the arbitration agreement to patients in his
office. 93 In the hospital, the staff should present the arbitration agreement
to patients as a distinct event so it is not simply an additional form to
execute. In addition, the staff who present the arbitration agreement to
patients should fully understand the arbitration program and have
sufficient time to present clearly the options to patients.94 The report
suggested that an arbitration agreement may be altered to secure an
affirmative declaration from the patients, but in this context, all changes
must be initiated by the patient and he must sign the agreement, indicating
90 MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 600.5065 (1979).
91 APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH, INC., EVALUATION, STATE OF MICHIGAN MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE ARBITRATION PROGRAM SUMMARY REPORT (1983).
912 d. at 32-34.
93 1d. at 33.
94 Id.
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that he understands the program. In particular, the patient should under-
stand that signing the arbitration agreement is not a prerequisite of the
receipt of care or treatment; that the panel is composed of an attorney, a
health care provider, and a lay citizen; that in signing the arbitration
agreement, he is choosing to resolve any medical malpractice dispute by
arbitration rather than in the courts; that there is a revocation procedure
available, and the patient should understand that the arbitration option is
generally deemed final and binding except in rare circumstances. 5 Appel-
late review of arbitration is narrow, and the Medical Malpractice Arbitra-
tion Program was designed to be consistent with the general arbitration
procedures.
B. ARBITRATION PANEL COMPOSITION
The evaluation results indicated that there was no basis for any pre-
sumption of bias on the part of any panel member of the arbitration panel,
including the health care provider. However, in response to proposals to
remove the doctor or hospital administrator from the panel, the report
concluded that there was no reason to believe that the performance of the
arbitration system would be "adversely affected by a change in panel
composition .
96
C. OUTPATIENT AND EMERGENCY ROOM ARBITRATION OFFERING
A more cautious presentation of the arbitration agreement must be
made to patients in emergency room and outpatient setting. Given the
substantial burden placed on hospital administrators under circumstances
unique to both emergency room and outpatient settings, the arbitration
program should be modified to allow hospitals to use their discretion
insofar as offering or not offering the arbitration agreement.9 7
9 Ild. at 34.
96 Id. at 40. The system of utilizing professionals rather than peers was to insure that
histrionics and emotional soliloquies by skilled advocates would be displaced by a cautious and
informed weighing of the evidence. By being impervious to these especial machinations, the
expectation is that the disposition of malpractice claims in arbitration are more representative
of the plaintiff's actual injuries. In some measure, arbitration can be deemed "protectionist"
by both the consumer of health care services and the medical profession. Of the 419 cases
initiated between 1976 and February 29, 1984, 86 resulted in awards. There was a unan-
imous ruling in all but one of these decisions. Although the plaintiffs' advocates contend
that the inclusion of medical specialists on the panel favors physicians and protects health care
providers, the statistical information supports a contrary conclusion. The arbitration panel is
required, as are judges and juries, to follow established legal precepts and standards in
determining fault.
97 1d. at 41-42.
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D. CONTINUATION OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION
To maximize the benefits of arbitration, a significant majority of health
care providers must support the Medical Malpractice Arbitration Program.
Statutory authorization for the program should be assigned to the Division
of Health Facilities, Licensing and Certification, Department of Public
Health. 9s
The major obstacle toward achieving a thorough and balanced report
on the arbitration process was Applied Social Research, Inc.'s failure to
secure comparable statistics from the court systems in Michigan. There-
fore, the empirical results of the survey should be viewed with caution and
circumspection.
Nevertheless, given the general recommendations of the Report, it
would behoove the members of the legal and medical professions to pro-
selytize the benefits of arbitration to the health care consuming public and
to insure its continuance. These benefits include an expeditious, creative,
and more humane resolution of medical malpractice claims. 99
VI. CONCLUSION
The Michigan Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act was the Michigan
legislature's response to the growing malpractice crisis. It provided an
alternative mechanism for the resolution of disputes that arise during the
course of providing medical care. Despite constitutional and contractual
challenges to the arbitration system, the Michigan Supreme Court ap-
proved the legislature's arbitration system. Other states that look for possi-
ble solutions to the malpractice crisis should review Michigan's experience
under its statute.
Currently, legal scholars continue to debate the relative merits of
Michigan's medical arbitration scheme. Does it dilute the penumbra of
procedural and substantive rights to which a plaintiff is entitled? Does it
deprive the patient of a meaningful choice of forum because the environ-
ment in which the Agreement to Arbitrate is offered allegedly threatens
subtly the patient's emotional stability? Should the program be replaced by
peer screening committees, members of which can, due to professed exper-
tise, resolve disputes more effectively and efficiently? Will the program, if
permitted to continue, assist in lessening the malpractice crisis?
While the supreme court decided these issues in favor of the constitu-
98 ld. at 43.
99 Although the ASR survey of arbitration disclosed that dispositions in arbitration take
two months less than dispositions in a court, it is recognized that this situation is, by and large,
a consequence of the legal battles being waged. Now that the constitutional challenges have
been resolved, the cases should progress more rapidly.
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tionality and validity of the arbitration process in Morris, observers will
continue to question whether arbitration panels are impartial and whether
a patient makes a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of a constitu-
tional right when he signs an Agreement to Arbitrate. The need for a
better understanding of the arbitration process in a malpractice setting
continues. The arbitration process was not intended to be a panacea for the
crisis enveloping the medical profession in the 1970's. It was designed and
promoted as a viable and humane alternative to the "litigation explosion."
In addressing the members of the legal profession at the ABA meeting
in Las Vegas in February of 1984, Chief Justice Burger observed that we
have become "mesmerized by the rule of law .... " He continued to note:
Our distant forebearers moved slowly from trial by battle and
other barbaric means of solving conflicts and disputes, and we
must move away from total reliance on the adversary contest
resolving all disputes. For some disputes, trials will be the only
means, but for many claims, trials by the adversarial contest must
in time go the way of the ancient trial by battle and blood. Our
system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient for
a truly civilized people. To rely on the adversarial process as the
principle means of resolving conflicting claims is a mistake that must be
corrected. 100
A close look at the process and its operational facets should yield the
recognition that the drafters of the legislation have realized, albeit in part,
the satisfaction of their objectives. Its survival will not be a Phyrric victory
for its proponents, nor a resounding defeat for its opponents. The legisla-
tive enactments of 1975 were intended to extend equity, justice and law
beyond the formalistic parameters of the courtroom. Polemics can no more
be defeasible in legal jurisprudence than in arbitral jurisprudence. Neither
system professes superiority; both possess attributes. Sophisticated com-
mentators and jurists will regard malpractice arbitration in this light.
100 Address by Chief Justice Burger, American Bar Association convention, in Las Vegas
(Feb. 1984).
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